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This Side of Being and Non-Being
The salt in the cruet in front of me is capable of dissolving in water. And Mary
can sing. What makes my assertions true? Is the relevant truth-maker of the
same type as the truth-makers of my assertions that the salt is white, that it is
solid, that it has a certain mass m, that Mary is a brunette or has a headache?
Meinong gave an answer to these questions in a paper published in 1919,
‘Allgemeines zur Lehre der Dispositionen’ (General Remarks on the Theory
of Dispositions).1 This is one of Meinong’s last pieces of work but the main
ideas it contains had been worked out at least twenty years earlier2 as his own
early papers and work on the topic by his pupils show.3 One example of early
use of the theory of dispositions is his argument against Brentano’s view that
in drawing a conclusion one is aware that there is a perceived relation of cau-
sation between premises and conclusions. This view, he suggests, overlooks
the role of unconscious dispositional partial causes that are at work when we
draw conclusions.4 Brentano himself had appealed to the distinction between
mental phenomena and dispositions to these in the course of discussing the
notion of the unconscious. Philosophers, he writes, ‘were for a long time well
acquainted with the fact that one can possess a treasure of acquired knowl-
edge without thinking of this knowledge; but these philosophers quite rightly
thought of this knowledge as dispositions to certain acts of thinking, and of an
acquired character as a disposition to certain affects and activities of the will
but not as being itself cognition or consciousness’ (Brentano 1973, p. 144).
Another example is Meinong’s 1894 account of the difference between occur-
rent emotions and dispositions to emotions.5
Although Meinong’s work on the theory of objects or ontology has by and
large come to be equated with his work on such Baroque entities as non-
obtaining states of affairs (Objektive), objects that may or may not exist and
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incomplete i.e. arbitrary or generic objects, his more spectacular ontological
commitments were in fact complemented by a thorough account of the ontol-
ogy of the most basic, or Romanesque, kinds of spatio-temporal entities, of
entities that are this side of being and non-being.
Both his early work on the ontology of measurement6 and his paper on dis-
positions belong under this heading. Indeed, as his more careful commentators
have pointed out, Meinong normally only introduces an entity of a Baroque
kind when he has thoroughly convinced himself that a more homely ontology
is incomplete. His theory of dispositions shows him at work on some of the
most ground level problems of ontology. Unfortunately Meinong’s account
of the properties and dispositions of spatio-temporal entities, like other such
accounts by Brentano and his heirs—I am thinking in particular of Husserl’s
theory of individual properties and of Brentano’s theory of space, time and
continua7—are almost completely unknown. Meinong’s theory of dispositions
is a quite general theory of the possibilities open to spatio-temporal entities
such as things and people, but most of what he has to say concerns the possi-
bilities open to people and it is for the latter that he reserves the term ‘disposi-
tions,’ as being slightly more neutral than ‘ability’ (Vermoegen) and capability
or capacity (Faehigkeit).
I shall first set out the main lines of Meinong’s account then look at the theo-
ries of dependence and possibility on which it is based. Finally I consider some
applications of the theory, most of which are at least hinted at by Meinong.
Meinong’s Account of Dispositions
When we assert of someone that he has artistic taste we are not, Meinong points
out, talking about some particular experience this person has at that time. But
nor is what we say totally unconnected with this person’s experiences. Rather,
we mean that this person has certain experiences under certain conditions. His
artistic taste is a ‘relatively enduring property.’ Is this property, which enables
someone to identify more readily than others what is and is not aesthetically
valuable, what we would call a disposition of this person? Meinong thinks
not. For that which enables me to be or behave in a certain way is not itself
what we would call a disposition or capacity. In order to see this it helps to
consider properties other than, say, artistic taste, which is ‘postulated on the
basis of a subject’s behaviour’ (D 291). We should look at cases where the
nature of the property involved is ‘directly known.’ Someone who is short-
sighted behaves in quite characteristic ways because (often) of the anomalous
shape of his eye-ball. But this shape of his eye-ball is not any disposition.
Rather, Meinong suggests, it is a property on which the disposition we call
short-sightedness is based. We might say that a disposition is the property of
having a property such as the shape of one’s eye-ball.8 The property on which
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a disposition rests Meinong calls a basis or base (Grundlage), the same word
Armstrong was to use much later to express a very similar idea.9 The mani-
festations or actualisations of a disposition Meinong labels the “correlates” of
that disposition. A correlate of a disposition is either what he calls a psychic
experience—a psychological act or state—or a physical experience—a some-
what peculiar term for intentional bodily movements or states.
Dispositions also clearly involve the notion of possibility, in particular the
possibility involved in the means-end relation. It is possible to employ this or
that means to obtain a given end. Someone who has learnt to play the saxo-
phone has acquired a certain constitution that is the means to the end of playing
his instrument. The musician’s constitution is the property underlying the dis-
position that disposes him to obtain his goals. The reason why we do not say
of someone who has been shot accidentally that he had a disposition to be shot
is that none of the partial causes (or causal conditions) that contributed to the
accident, e.g. his position, stand in the same intimate relation to their effect
as does the saxophonist’s constitution to his performances, the means-end re-
lation. Meinong notes that not all dispositions are acquired intentionally and
that not all acquired underlying properties are means to conscious goals. But
he thinks that the notion of an end or goal can nevertheless be applied to such
cases (D 36) provided ends are regarded not as mysterious causes but as the
objects of the states of desire through which we are aware of our goals.10 It
is true that our awareness of many means, of the bases underlying our dis-
positions, is not only often absent but may well depend on the progress of
science—as in the case of short-sightedness. But as Meinong points out, we
all treat clocks, telephones and cars as means even when we are quite ignorant
of the specific properties of these objects that make it possible to tell the time,
to talk to strangers and so on. In these cases as in the case of my dispositions to
have or produce psychological or behavioral episodes it is the clock, telephone
or myself as a whole, in abstraction from the relevant specific properties that is
regarded as a means.
Meinong might also have mentioned that the relation between a basis and
the manifestations of a disposition are normally irreversible just as are more
familiar means-end relations.
There is one important objection to Meinong’s use of the means-end re-
lation in his analysis of dispositions, an objection that applies also to more
recent work on the same topic under the heading of dynamic modalities,11 an
objection he does not note. His analysis presupposes that the psychological
and behavioral episodes that are the actualisations or manifestations of a per-
son’s dispositions are all subject to the will. Now although my movements
are subject to my will it seems doubtful whether all my psychological states
are subject to my will in the same way. I can choose to indulge in a phantasy
about or presentation of Claire but seeing, occurrent belief and indeed desire
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are not subject to my will in the same way.12 I can successfully try to put my-
self into a position which is such that perception, belief or desire are brought
about but these states are not the immediate objects of my will. In honour of
Pascal—who thought that belief could be induced by going to Church, saying
one’s prayers etc.—and Sartre—who thought that love could be induced by
bearing flowers to the loved one and going through the motions of a lover—we
might call this indirect connexion between the will and certain experiences the
French Connexion.
However, if this qualification as well as those of Meinong himself are borne
in mind no danger is involved in allowing Meinong his extension of the concept
of the means-end relation, an extension that allows him to determine more
closely the type of possibility involved in dispositions.
Dependence
Meinong’s account of dispositions stands at the intersection of two other much
more general theories whose applications extend far beyond the domain of the
dispositions and capacities of spatio-temporal objects. The first of these theo-
ries is the account of existential dependence that Meinong attempts to set out
in his 1899 paper on higher-order objects, that he makes extensive use of in
his work on the philosophy of mind and that Husserl presents in a vastly su-
perior form in the third of his Logical Investigations. This theory is concerned
first and foremost with the properties of the relation of dependence insofar as
this links together particulars, dependent and independent. It is thus a theory
of what is this side of being and non-being. However, since both Husserl and
Meinong thought that such dependence relations obtain only in virtue of rela-
tions between ideal entities, and since Meinong often seems to have thought,
particularly when reflecting on rather than simply using the theory of depen-
dence, that to be dependent is to be ideal, it is a theory which, if we are not
careful, can take us fairly rapidly into the realm of Baroque entities. The sec-
ond theory is Meinong’s account of possibility and its bearers.
If we ask what sort of a property Jim’s cheerfulness is we find ourselves all
too quickly wondering about very peculiar sorts of properties. If, however, we
look at the different moments involved in the manifestation or actualisation of
such a disposition we find that these moments involved are all quite homely en-
tities and that the difficult question concerns the way they hang together. The
moments or elements already introduced comprise: substances, in particular
persons or subjects; enduring states of the latter; dispositional correlates, in
particular mental acts and actions. Meinong introduces two further items: the
trigger (Erloeser) of a disposition and the founder (Begruender) of a disposi-
tion. A subject’s states—e.g. the shape of his eye-ball—belong to the causal
conditions required by his manifestations of short-sightedness. But these con-
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ditions are normally triggered off by an efficient cause, light must for example
penetrate the eye of the short-sighted man if he is to behave short-sightedly.
The second item, the founder of a disposition is what causally brings about an
enduring basis in a subject and is required, Meinong says, for all dispositions
except those that are innate, if there are any. This requires a slight qualifica-
tion to deal with a well-known problem. Consider two propositions p and q,
very different in content, to each of which I am disposed to assent if asked,
my beliefs in which were brought about in very different circumstances. It is
plausible to say that I am disposed to assent to p & q even though there was no
event that triggered off the state (if there is one?) that underlies my disposition
to assent to the conjunction.
Of these moments the first and the last three enjoy a relatively uncontro-
versial ontological status: they are all unrepeatable particulars. The subject
of a disposition because it is a substance; the correlates or manifestations
of a disposition, that which sets it off and that which brings it into being
because they are temporal episodes, events or processes. Only the basis of
a disposition seems to present an ontological puzzle. This puzzle makes it-
self felt in the peculiar terminological contortions one finds in the writings
of contemporary defences of entities in this category. Armstrong describes
what Meinong calls the basis of a disposition a ‘categorical property’ and
Mackie an ‘occurrent property.’ ‘Categorical’ describes a type of proposi-
tion, not a type of property. Meinong’s bases present no puzzles because he
has available an account of bases according to which these are, like events
and processes, dependent particulars, but unlike these in that they are enduring
states. Enduring particular states are the main examples that Stout advances
of what he calls ‘characters,’ which have also been called ‘particular(ised)
properties.’13 States, indeed, are static properties, events and processes kinetic
properties.
What are the dependence relations linking all the moments involved in the
actualisation or manifestation of a disposition? Acquired bases, unlike innate
bases, depend unilaterally on a subject. A correlate depends unilaterally on
a base. A trigger, though it acts on a base, is bilaterally dependent on a corre-
late, a founder is bilaterally dependent on a base. (It is arguable that a correlate
is only one-sidedly dependent on a base, a base only one-sidedly dependent
on a founder, but I shall not pursue this point here since it requires a diffi-
cult distinction between the analytic relations between conceptual correlates
and synthetic relations). Existential dependence, in its simplest form, obtains
when a particular that exists, endures goes on or occurs cannot exist etc. unless
some other particular exists etc.14 Of course, this basic structure can be varied
in a number of different ways. Thus both electric conductors and electrolytes
have the capacity to conduct electric current. But actualisations or correlates
of this disposition are based in each case on materially quite distinct states of
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the two particulars: in a conductor the current is carried by electrons, in an
electrolyte by ions.
Possibility
We have seen that the analysis of dispositions involves recognizing not only
possibility but also the notion of a goal. But how else should we characterize
the possibility that is asserted in the claim that Mary can sing? Meinong con-
trasts the sort of possibility involved here with a different sort of possibility.
The contrast he is interested in can be approached, he says, both from the point
of view of the theory of means and ends and from that of the theory of possi-
bility. ‘The correlation of means to end can be based either on the nature of the
means or end, and thus inhere in an enduring fashion in the means, or it can be
transitory, as when it is based on a merely accidental constellation’ (D 293).
A sanatorium, because of its layout and equipment, is destined to serve the
purpose of healing the sick. But a burnt match serves only temporarily and
exceptionally as a pencil. Similarly, we can distinguish between relatively en-
during and relatively transient possibilities. When we say of a ship that it is
mobile, of a glass that is is fragile we are talking of the former; when we talk
of the dangerousness of Tell’s arrow for his son only a transient possibility is
involved. Meinong considers another example of transient possibilities in or-
der to arrive at a quite general distinction between two sorts of possibilities of
which the distinction between transient and enduring possibilities is only a spe-
cial case. Consider a die of which we can say that the possibility of throwing
a six with it is 1/6. Clearly we cannot assert that this possibility obtains tout
court. A number of conditions must be satisfied before making such an asser-
tion: a thrower, the fact that the die is sometimes thrown, a suitable surface.
These conditions, or ‘supplements’ as Meinong calls them, are not required
by possibilities such as mobility or fragility, possibilities that are properly, or
canonically expressed by saying that the ship can move, or that the glass can
break (D 295, UMW 225–226). In the latter cases possibility is rooted in those
properties of individuals he calls bases, and not normally in ‘supplements.’
The distinction between ‘suppletory’ possibility—the die case—and ‘insup-
pletory’ possibility—dispositions of animate and animate individuals—rests
on Meinong’s account of the bearers of possibility, of that which is properly
speaking possible, an account set out in his 1915 seven-hundred page opus
Ueber Moeglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit. The primary bearers of possibil-
ity are ‘Objektive’—just as for Husserl and his early students they are states of
affairs—and only derivatively the objects that compose such ‘Objektive.’ Since
many such objects are actual and spatio-temporal and since Meinong tends to
be Megarian about these15 he introduces a type of object that intervenes be-
tween actual, spatio-temporal objects and ‘Objektive’—incomplete objects.16
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These, rather than complete spatio-temporal objects, are the derivative bearers
of possibility. They are exceptions to the Principle of the Excluded Middle,
understood ontologically. Something blue, unlike this blue watch, is indeter-
minate with respect to extension i.e. something extended.17
Meinong often characterises incomplete objects as being essentially objects
of cognition. The propositionally expressed possibility that N, who is my
friend, will visit me tomorrow corresponds to an ‘Objektive’ that contains the
incomplete object, N insofar as I know him, which derivatively has the possi-
bility that primarily attaches to the ‘Objektive.’ ‘Insofar as,’ like ‘qua,’ turns an
unrestricted into a restrictive description. (On this idiom, see UMW 227). In
such a case Meinong calls the friend insofar as I know him an accessory object
by means of which I intend or mean the primary or target object, N. Here as
elsewhere Meinong attempts to modify the three-way distinction, that is the
hallmark of Brentano’s heirs, between act or sign-use, content or sense and ob-
ject in favour of a two-way distinction, à la Russell or Moore, between act or
sign and (complicated webs of) objects. When, as in this case, the incomplete
object is associated with a spatio-temporal object, possibility may also be said
to attach to the latter, but at two removes. Such cases illustrate what Meinong
calls ‘applied possibility’ (UMW 227). But now what exactly are the incom-
plete objects that bear the possibility that a die will turn up a six and that Mary
will sing?
In the case of the die the relevant incomplete object just is what we described
above as the ‘supplements’ or complex of conditions that include: that some-
one throws the die, that a flat surface is available etc. This complex of condi-
tions, often expressed in a clause such as ‘insofar as this is a good die’ (UMW
226), has neither ‘being, nor non-being, but is indeterminate with respect to
its being, as is an incomplete object’ (D 294). Notice that Meinong mentions
only a comparison with incomplete objects and does not actually say here that
the relevant complex of conditions is an incomplete object, a claim he makes
explicitly at UMW, p. 226. In the case of Mary and her dispositions, where
no supplements are necessary—for the true dispositional assertion, rather than
for the actualisation of the disposition, Meinong should have added—the in-
complete object which is the bearer of her possibilities is an association of
determinations of Mary, those determinations which constitute the basis of her
disposition to sing.
But why does Meinong think that the incomplete object which is the union
of certain properties of Mary’s vocal chords and brain, of Sam’s eyeballs or of
the chemical and physical structures of this lump of salt is any the less com-
plete than Mary, Sam or this lump of salt? There appears to be a contradiction
between the claim above that the bases of a disposition are dependent particu-
lars and their status as incomplete objects. Meinong does not raise this ques-
tion, perhaps because of certain life-long worries about the ontological status
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of properties, a problem about which he often changed his mind. The view
that bases, like other properties, are dependent particulars which instantiate re-
peatable properties—Husserl speaks of moments instantiating species—is the
view that is held in Ueber die Erfahrungsgrundlagen des Wissens (1906); be-
fore then and in his tome on possibility and probability he held that properties
are not particulars but repeatable entities that somehow become concrete when
they become the properties of concrete entities.18 His accounts of bases and
of the bearers of dispositional possibilities can be made to fit both accounts of
properties, although the fit is neater if ‘properties’ is regarded as embracing
(a) instances of repeatable properties and (b) these properties themselves.
Consider Mary’s ability to sing. Let us assume that her ingrained brain states
and the structure of her vocal chords have the status of dependent particulars.
Call this complex of particulars a. It is on a that every act of singing by Mary
depends. But the bearer of the possibility that Mary sings is a insofar as I know
of it, or, if we bear in mind Meinong’s remarks on telephones, Mary insofar
as I know of her (or, if not all incomplete objects are cognition-dependent,
something A). The relation between a qua known to me and a is instantia-
tion. a instantiates a qua known to me. Notice that this does not exclude the
possibility that a also instantiates something A. Meinong’s account of disposi-
tions leads him at one point to recognize that his earlier bald claim in his 1915
work on possibility and probability that possibility always attaches primarily
to Objektive and only derivatively to (in)complete objects needs modifying in
order to do justice to the ‘sui generis form of the notion of possibility’ (D 301)
described by sentences containing ‘can,’ i.e. to de re possibility.19 In the case
of ‘Mary can sing,’ ‘The glass can break’ the expression of modality does
not form a sentence from a sentence. Rather, it operates on the verb (which
Meinong would have classed as a type of name) to form a new verb (name).
The possibility of singing attaches to Mary just as immediately as it does to the
corresponding state of affairs.
The Episodic Nature of Psychological Entities
The sharp distinction between dispositions to mental episodes and these epi-
sodes themselves highlights the episodic nature of psychological entities. This
is a presupposition of most work by Brentano and his heirs in the philosophy of
mind. Thus Brentano stresses that acquired dispositions to have psychic phe-
nomena are connected with real entities but are not any sort of psychological
entity.20 Husserl points out in 1894 that
the differences [between] dispositions, unconscious real possibilities, cannot
constitute the differences between or in experienced realities, they may have at
most the value of causal moments on which the phenomenal differences depend
(Husserl 1979, p. 306).
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Meinong merely makes explicit in the article on dispositions a point famil-
iar to Brentano’s heirs: ‘any attempt to make of psychic experiences any sort
of enduring determinations fails completely’ (D 297). The background to
Meinong’s claim was the destructive criticism to which Herbart and his follow-
ers in the nineteenth century had subjected vague talk about mental capacities.
One of Meinong’s aims is to bring out the fact that only if a sharp distinction
between psychological episodes and dispositions to these is drawn can the cat-
egory of dispositions and their bases be defended. The episodic nature of the
psychological is, however, easily overlooked by philosophers who think that
the philosophy of mind is merely the study of the language used to describe
and express psychological facts, since the distinctions between episodes, dis-
positions and the states which are their bases are first and foremost ontological
distinctions.
Even if it be conceded that the psychological entities that correspond to most
verbs of saying, thinking and doing are episodic, there are at least two candi-
dates for the title of non-episodic psychological entity. First, the self conceived
as a psychic substance, an entity that has no place in Meinong’s ontology and
to which I shall return in the next section. Second, might not the bases of dis-
positions be psychological entities? Meinong mentions that reasons might be
found for putting forward the hypothesis that there are enduring psychologi-
cal states on which our more familiar psychological episodes depend. But it
is certain that if we stay within the limits of descriptive psychology we shall
find that we are not aware of any experiences that have the required duration
(D 303).21
Let us look briefly at the most striking application of the distinction between
transient psychological episodes and enduring non-psychological states within
the Brentanist tradition. Ehrenfels’ wholly naturalistic value theory is built
around the distinction between more or less pleasurable experiences and de-
sires, on the one hand, and the corresponding dispositions to have these on the
other hand. His extended and very subtle defence of what he calls the law of the
relative promotion of happiness (which can be considered as a generalisation
of the law of marginal utility) makes use not only of the experience-disposition
distinction but also of an ordering relation among the (un)pleasurable experi-
ences which, at a given moment, I could have in view of my dispositions and
their bases.
Every act of desiring is conditioned, both in its goal and in its intensity, by the
relative promotion of happiness it brings—in the light of the feeling-dispositions
of the individual in question—at its time of entry into the consciousness of this
individual and during the time it remains therein (Ehrenfels, 1982, p. 245).
Since a relation amongst possible correlates of dispositions cannot be causally
effective, every act of desiring, we ought to say, is conditioned by a relation
202 Kevin Mulligan
amongst dispositional bases, a point Ehrenfels comes close to making on one
occasion.22
One way of bringing out the peculiarly transitory nature of whatever is psy-
chological is to specify what might be called the maximum duration of a psy-
chological episode. Roughly speaking this will be the period that a well-trained
fakir is capable of remaining in, say, a state of observing a table. Such a state
will be bounded by two states of dreamless sleep and is very unlikely to last
for longer than two or three days.
Many psychological and psychological-behavioural predicates appear to
correspond to long-lasting states, as when we speak of Jim’s hate, love or
cheerfulness. But appearances are deceptive here, as in the case of predications
of secondary quality terms. Insofar as Jim’s hate is psychological or indeed be-
havioural it is as transient if intermittently regular as is the redness of a table.
His dispositions to occurrent emotions and their underlying bases endure, al-
though not in the same way, but these are not psychological or behavioural.
One natural way of classifying psychological episodes is the three-way classi-
fication into punctual events, processes and states: deciding and meaning (like
the actions of winning and promising) are (at least phenomenologically) punc-
tual; deliberation and inferring are processes that take time and have parts that
are not themselves deliberatings or inferrings; sadness and serenity are states
that last for a short period, though they may recur, during each part of which
the person in question is sad or serene. Notice that genuinely psychological
states are in general much shorter than the non-psychological states that under-
lie them and other psychological episodes.23
The thesis that whatever is psychological is episodic seems to conflict with
one of the most familiar of psychological phenomena. Jim meets Mary for
the first time and is henceforth said to know her, to be acquainted with her.
He sees that she is tall and dark and is henceforth said to believe this of her.
Again and again psychological episodes leave their mark on us, they seem to
give rise to states. But this claim is ambiguous. In order to grasp the ambi-
guity involved, two distinct types of change should be distinguished. Consider
the behavioural episodes of baking a cake and pushing a cart, and the non-
behavioural episode which occurs when snow melts. When snow melts it may
stay melted, cakes may stay baked but the cart does not stay pushed. Each
of the three episodes marks a transition from one state to another but melt-
ing and baking are more intimately linked to the states of which they are the
beginnings than is the pushing of the cart to its new position. Notice that if
one admits into one’s ontology the dependent particulars I have called events
and processes, and if one accepts that some such particulars are the beginnings
of states, and are intimately linked to states, then it becomes very difficult
to deny that these (homologous) states are also dependent particulars. I shall
not attempt to characterise the nature of this link here, nor shall I defend the
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claim that the distinction appealed to here is an ontologically genuine distinc-
tion.
Rather, I shall simply rely on what I hope is an apparent analogy between
pushing carts and psychological episodes. When Jim meets Mary and sees that
she is tall and dark these episodes do not normally give rise to psychological
states that are linked to them in the way that baking cakes is related to baked
cakes. This is not to claim that Jim’s experiences do not mark the beginning
of any new state in him. Just as pushing the cart marks the beginning of a new
position for the cart so too Jim finds himself in a new state after meeting Mary.
But what has changed are his dispositions to have and produce experiences and
actions because of the new underlying states he acquires. (I said that normally
seeing Mary does not give rise to a psychological state that is intimately linked
to it; it could, as when Jim’s perception gives rise to a period of observation of
Mary).
Perhaps the philosophically most important example of the thesis that psy-
chological episodes normally give rise to states that are not intimately linked
to them in the way described is the relation between assertions and epistemic
seeings, on the one hand, and belief, on the other hand. The jargon of propo-
sitional attitudes hides the fact that the beliefs on which such episodes de-
pend and which such episodes often instigate are not themselves psychological
episodes, and so not attitudes, but dispositions, based on real states, to have or
produce these.24 In general, then, what is psychological is not only episodic
it is such that it does not give rise to a psychological state which is intimately
linked to it in the way that melting and staying melted are.
Meinong’s account of dispositions may also be invoked to help solve a well-
known puzzle about the relation between two types of psychological episode,
assertion (or judgement) and perception. Brentano’s pupils are well-known for
the claim that the three-way distinction between act, content and object applies
to all mental episodes and states, and not just to assertions. But neither they nor
subsequent philosophers have been very successful in applying the content-
object distinction—between the object of my act and the way it is given to
me—to perception.25 The two most obvious strategies are (a) to claim that
differences in perceptual content just are differences of perspective and (b)
to claim that the content or sense of a perception is given by the description
I would or could give of the seen object. If one adopts the latter strategy one
can then argue in a familiar way from the existence of different descriptions for
the same object to a content-object distinction. In this way the content-object
distinction for perception profits from the same distinction for linguistic acts.
This strategy is unsatisfactory if one is persuaded that perception and assertion
are very different types of act. After all, when I see the passing postman I do
not name him with the help of the definite description ‘the passing postman’.
But assimilation of perception to assertion is not the only way of saving this
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strategy. It is enough to bear in mind the possibility that one and the same
dispositional base (or closely related bases) underlies both my perception and
the definite description I could produce of what I have seen.
Meinong himself makes a related point in his tome on Emotional Presenta-
tion. Perceptions and other acts in which we take the objects of these acts to ex-
ist (Ernstvorstellungen) leave behind them ‘dispositional traces that make pos-
sible and facilitate phantasy presentations [memories and phantasies in the nar-
rower sense of the word] of the same objects (gegenstandsgleich)’ (Meinong
1916, p. 28). A similar relation, he adds, obtains between judgements and
assumptions, and between emotions and my memories of these.
Basic Continuity vs. Continuity of the Self
Like some other heirs of Brentano, such as Ehrenfels, Stumpf, Witasek and
the author of the first edition of the Logical Investigations, Meinong not only
stressed the episodic nature of psychological entities but seems also to have
accepted that there are no psychological entities that are not episodes. Like
Mach he seems to have countenanced neither enduring nor transient psycho-
logical substances, neither a RES cogitans, nor a res COGITANS. Such a view
must of course attempt to account for the notions of personal identity appar-
ently presupposed by such phenomena as obligation, responsibility, shame and
regret. Recently the traditional appeals by enemies of the self to memory and
bodily continuity have been strengthened by bringing in the notion of a causal
link between memories and their objects.26 Some remarks of Meinong indicate
an additional obvious way in which we can account for the coherence of ‘my’
experiences.
[T]he most varied intellectual and emotional experiences of one and the same
subject, insofar as they occur repeatedly, can be seen to be linked if we presup-
pose a relatively enduring base on which are built dispositions that are no less
enduring. At the same time the enduring dispositional bases between tempo-
rally separated experiences of the same subject will help to effect connexions in
such a way that the influence of past experiences on future ones need no longer
present an insoluble puzzle (D 298).
As Meinong points out, the coherence of ‘my’ ‘practical behaviour’ can be
explained in the same way. My actions presuppose wishes and needs and it
is the bases underlying my dispositions to have certain needs and wishes that
explain the ways my temporally separate actions hang together.
The suggestion, then, is that Meinong’s remarks here can be employed to
specify a way in which the unity of ‘my’ mental states and actions can be
accounted for without appealing to a self. In addition to the well-known expla-
nations in terms of the relations of veridicality and causal dependence between
mental episodes—a perception and a subsequent memory—and in terms of the
relation of genidentity between states of a body (or between temporal slices of
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such a body) we may appeal to the relation between body-states, in particular
brain-states, and the different psychological episodes which ‘actualise’ these,
a relation Meinong also describes as that of a causal condition to an effect.
Notice that Meinong’s appeal to the enduring causal conditions that serve as
intermediaries between causes and effects means that his suggestion is distinct
from, although a natural complement to, recent attempts to specify the right
sort of causal link between episodes such as my perception of Barry and my
memory of him.
Meinong himself does not explicitly appeal to dispositional bases as an al-
ternative to the self. He merely shows how they serve to explain the unity of
‘my’ experiences and actions. Stumpf, however, does make use of a somewhat
more primitive account of dispositions than that of Meinong in the context of
his rejection of the self: ‘an ego [     ] is a whole of conscious states that hang
together and the unconscious dispositions associated with these.’27
Habits and Suggestions
From Hume and Reid to Wittgenstein philosophers have not hesitated to make
theoretical use of the notion of a habit. But one often has the impression that
the importance accorded this notion is inversely proportional to the amount of
clarification it receives. A cursory nod in the direction of the complex phe-
nomenon of association usually suffices. But what, after all, are the ‘custom-
ary connexions’ that, according to Hume, are given in inward sensation?28
Meinong’s account of dispositions enables him to give the beginnings of an
analysis of two different ways in which dispositions can be formed, via habit-
uation29 and via suggestion.
Whenever we become accustomed or disaccustomed to something the rel-
evant new dispositions (habits) are brought about or founded by experiences
(a concept Meinong employs, it should be remembered, in such a way that
even actions fall under it) that are correlates i.e. actualisations of the antecedent
dispositions (D 306). I may become accustomed to a smell either because of
a change in its effect on me or because the (dis)agreeable feeling accompany-
ing it diminishes. Since the sensation remains the same in both cases—a claim
the gestalt psychologists were to deny—the change must concern the subject.
A certain dispositional constitution of the subject is triggered by this sensation;
the correlate of the disposition is the sense-experience or feeling at its original
strength. Under the influence of the sensation the first disposition actualised is
transformed into a weaker one, which in turn is manifested in a weaker corre-
late. Habituation is therefore a decrease in a disposition and what decreases the
disposition is the experience of its correlate. The change in the first disposition
is the foundation of a new disposition and the cause of this foundation is the
trigger of the first disposition, the sensation.
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Habit formings with this structure always involve fatigue, and there is no
experience, no mental state or action, that does not fatigue (D 306).
The typist who gets used to a new type-writer changes his dispositions, too,
but in this case the mechanism described above brings about an increase rather
than a decrease in a disposition. Once again the correlate of the first disposi-
tion and the founder of the new disposition are the same, as are the trigger and
cause of the founder. We may regard this second example as a case of the phe-
nomenon of training, but it would be wrong to assume that all cases in which
dispositions are strengthened involve training, as all cases of decrease in a dis-
position involve fatigue. Rather, suggests Meinong, only active experiences
(apprehension that something is the case or epistemic seeing, action) but not
passive experiences (feelings, presentings) can be trained. (This claim appears
to conflict with the thesis already mentioned that only certain experiences, and
not apprehension or judgement, are subject to the will. The conflict disappears
if one bears in mind that someone can be trained to see that p only indirectly,
in the sense that he can be trained to put himself in a situation in which he
is likely to see that p. Here we have an instance of the French Connexion).
Training fatigues, but we can recover from this, whereas repetition of passive
experiences simply dulls, the strength of the relevant dispositions decreases.
Dispositions formed or founded through the influence of suggestion—a word
Reid had used to describe the same phenomena—come about in a number of
different ways. One example Meinong gives is of the person who is influenced
by the dialect of the area he finds himself in. He actualizes a disposition whose
correlates resemble utterances he has heard in the past (D 309) and we can see
that a disposition is involved if we contrast this case with that of a baby who
hears for the first time and imitates a weeping child.
We saw above that strings of ‘my’ experiences may be said to hang to-
gether because they are causally dependent on the same dispositional bases.
Meinong’s account of habit-forming episodes, i.e. episodes which not only ac-
tualise but also change dispositions can also contribute to an alternative to the
self. Relations of genidentity between ‘my’ dispositional bases brought about
by such episodes contribute to the continuity of ‘my’ bases.
Dispositional Sentences and Truth Makers
Meinong and Husserl would have found the popular claim that to understand
the meaning of a proposition just is to know its truth-conditions unacceptable,
at least in its usual general form. This in spite of the fact that they clearly
thought the theory of meaning was central to philosophy, and in spite of their
grasp of the notion of logical form and of their rudimentary accounts of what
a truth-maker is. Unlike many contemporary and later philosophers they were
of the opinion that formal semantics and formal ontology—or the general the-
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ory of objects—complement one another, but are by no means identical. Not
all complexity, they thought, is logical.30
Meinong’s account of dispositions provides, I suggest, a good example of
a case where the logical form and meaning of a sentence and the form and
matter of its truth-maker are, at least in part, quite clearly heterogeneous. What
makes ‘John can sing’ i.e. ‘It is possible for John to sing’ true? If ‘John is short-
sighted‘ means ‘It is not the case that it is possible for John to see a   b   c   d    
at distances d1   d2     ,’ what is the truth-maker of ‘It is possible for John to
see a   b   c     at distances d1   d2     ’? I shall not attempt to give a complete
answer to this question. But it is clear that if the Meinong-Armstrong account
of dispositions is correct the description of the truth-makers of such sentences
will contain, in addition, say, to a subjunctive conditional, at least two clauses
of the following sorts:
 a clause specifying that the relevant individual has some basis-property;
 a clause specifying the relevant base-property.
Now, as Meinong points out,
since dispositions are mere possibilities they cannot be perceived; perhaps their
real bases can be perceived, nevertheless they are not so to speak obvious and
often remain unknown for a long time (D 298)
Now the fact that dispositional bases are often unknown is also one reason for
not identifying such bases with the dispositions they found (D 291). A more
important consequence of this fact is that since the specification of a basis-
property cannot be read off from the corresponding attribution of a disposition
to a subject someone who grasps the sense of a dispositional sentence will
often not be able to describe this property. Must a grasp of the sense of a dis-
positional sentence involve knowledge that some basis property belongs to its
truth-conditions? Some philosophers, such as Ryle in his phenomenalist ac-
count of dispositions in The Concept of Mind, would have given a negative
answer to this question. Now that Meinong’s alternative to this phenomenalist
view is widely accepted perhaps the time has come to pursue his even more
radical suggestion that logical and ontological form do not coincide.31
Notes
1. Originally published in Meinong (1919), and now in the Gesamtausgabe, Volume VII, pp. 287–310.
I refer to this paper as D and give the Gesamtausgabe pagination.
2. See Höfler’s announcement in (1904), p. 79, note, of a forthcoming work by Meinong ‘On Causes,
Forces and Dispositions’ that would be based on discussions with Höfler and Oelzelt-Newin that had ex-
tended over many years; see also Höfler (1900), p. 61 note.
3. Cf. Meinong (1889) p. 162f., Oelzelt-Newin (1892), Witasek (1897), Höfler (co-authored with
Meinong) (1890), Saxinger (1901), (1902), (1904), (1906). On those dispositions which are the mastery of
concepts and knowing how to use a word, see Mally (1919) and the remarkable and influential Martinak
(1901).
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4. Meinong (1877), now in GA I, 1969, pp. 9, 11f.
5. Meinong (1894), §14, now in GA III, 1968. Ehrenfels (1982) (p. 229) rejects Brentano’s account
of love and hate as occurrent phenomena in favour of the view that they are dispositions—a point other
Austrian philosophers were to return to. Where “love” and “hate” are used to refer to actual phenomena,
Ehrenfels suggests, they refer to desires rather than emotions. Cf. Höfler 1897, §59, §65.
6. Meinong (1896). This work Russell absorbed and put to good use; see Russell (1899) and chs. XXI
and XXXI of his Principles of Mathematics; on Russell and Meinong on measurement see Spaier (1927),
especially pp. 138–139, 264–267.
7. See the third of Husserl’s Logical Investigations and Brentano (1976).
8. For a recent appeal to second-order properties in the theory of dispositions see Prior (1985), ch. 7.
See also Mumford (1998).
9. Armstrong (1968), pp. 87–88. Armstrong mentions Price’s (1953, p. 322) use of “categorical basis”.
10. This idea is worked out in detail in Meinong (1917), now in GA III, 1968, pp. 283–476.
11. Geach (1967), p. 15; Kenny (1975), p. 135.
12. See O’Shaughnessy (1980), Vol. I, ch. 1.
13. See Smith and Mulligan (1982), (1983); Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984); Campbell (1976).
14. See the papers referred to in the last note.
15. UMW, p. 223, Poser (1972), Chisholm (1982), p. 51.
16. These resemble the arbitrary and generic objects of Fine (1985) and Santambrogio (1987).
17. See UMW, §25. My strange use of nominal terms here reflects the way in which in Meinong’s
n-name theory of judgement the copula is flanked by nominal expressions—on this see Mulligan (1989).
Cf. the ontological principle Meinong formulates as ‘every object’ is/not ‘determinate with respect to every
object.’ Husserl, too, claimed that there were entities that are exceptions to the Excluded Middle, his species
(LU VI, §3).
18. See UMW, p. 169, and Grossman (1974), p. 206.
19. Cf. Hacking (1975). Meinong’s qualification is of particular interest in the light of the fact that the
view that alethic and deontic modalities attach fundamentally to propositions, a view found in Mally and
many other heirs of Brentano, was to become the dominant view.
20. Brentano (1973), ch. III, §6.
21. Cf. also Meinong (1877), p. 52.The best discussion of the physiological or psychological nature of
dispositional bases, as of the possible combination of one of these theses with commitment to a self is Broad
(1947), ch. X. Cf. also Witasek (1908), p. 64, p. 355 who notes that psychophysical parallelism, unlike an
interactionist position, must accept that dispositional bases are psychological; Ehrenfels (1982), p. 51, and
Hart (1988), ch. 3.
22. Ehrenfels (1887), p. 580; see also Ehrenfels (1982), p. 51.
23. This three-way classification of psychological episodes is due to Reinach (1911), who I suspect
was inspired by Meinong’s version of the distinction between active and passive experience. A full-blown
account of states, events and processes in general is set out by Ingarden (1964), §§ 28, 29, (1974), §90,
whose account of dispositions also resembles that of Meinong in several respects (see Ingarden (1965),
§59 (c)). Related three-way classifications are now quite common in linguistics and in the philosophy of
language, see e.g. Mourelatos (1978).
24. The first philosopher to stress the distinction between asserting and belief seems to have been
Reinach, see Reinach (1984). On his theory see Mulligan (1987). But although Reinach sees that be-
lief is not (or not only) episodic, like assertion, and that assertion depends unilaterally on belief, he argues
that belief is a state. Ramsey, Moore and Braithwaite appreciated the dispositional character of belief and
their work has been built on by Bennett (1976).
25. See the fifth and sixth of Husserl’s Logical Investigations; and on these Mulligan (1995).
26. See e.g. Parfit (1986), ch. 11.
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27. Stumpf (1939), Vol. I, p. 364. Like Meinong, Stumpf raises and leaves open the question whether
these ‘residues and dispositions’ are psychological, physiological or a mixture of the two.
28. A recent attempt at an analysis of habit is Duggan (1980).
29. Meinong’s analysis has much in common with what Husserl says about ‘passive syntheses’ and
‘Vermöglichkeiten.’ For a convenient account of Husserl’s work, see Holenstein (1972).
30. See the third and fourth of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, and Meinong (1899). For an account
of the heterogeneity of logic and ontology that is a bit less cryptic than the pronouncements of Husserl and
Meinong, see Mulligan, Simons and Smith (1984). It should be noted that the later Husserl often seems
more sympathetic than the earlier Husserl to the idea that logical and ontological form are isomorphic.
31. Ancestors of this paper were read at Manchester in 1983 and in Umea in 1984. I am grateful for
helpful remarks by the participants, in particular by Ingvar Johansson and Barry Smith.
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